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The Regulation of Discrimination 
by Individuals in the Market 
Heather M. Whitney† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2014, Airbnb came under fire when a Harvard Business School 
study showed that property owners were less likely to accept those with 
black-sounding names as renters and that non-black hosts were able to 
charge “approximately 12% more than black hosts, holding location, 
rental characteristics, and quality constant.”1 In the wake of public out-
cry, the company hired former Attorney General Eric Holder to help it 
devise a new antidiscrimination policy.2 
In an October 2016 working paper conducted by the National Bu-
reau of Economic Research, researchers looking at taxi-services Uber 
and Lyft showed that the cancellation rate for passengers with black-
sounding names was more than twice as high as for those with white-
sounding names.3 In response to the study, Senator Al Franken wrote 
to both Uber’s and Lyft’s CEOs to ask why it was necessary to include 
passenger names and photos, and what Uber and Lyft could do to end 
discrimination and better enforce their self-imposed antidiscrimination 
policies.4 While both CEOs defended the use of names and photos as 
 
 † Ph.D. Candidate in Philosophy, New York University. Visiting Researcher, Harvard Law 
School (Spring 2017); Bigelow Fellow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School 
(2014–16). The author wishes to thank Robert Mark Simpson, the participants in the University 
of Chicago Legal Forum Symposium on Law and the Disruptive Workplace, and members of the 
Legal Forum staff for their helpful feedback and suggestions. 
 1 Benjamin Edelman and Michael Luca, Digital Discrimination: The Case of Airbnb.com, 
(Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-054, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab 
stract_id=2377353 [https://perma.cc/XZX9-3CMV]. 
 2 See Brian Chesky, An Update on the Airbnb Anti-Discrimination Review, AIRBNB BLOG 
(July 20, 2016), http://blog.airbnb.com/an-update-on-the-airbnb-anti-discrimination-review/ [htt 
ps://perma.cc/M8K9-UWRU]. 
 3 See Yanbo Ge et al., Racial and Gender Discrimination in Transportation Network Compa-
nies, (NBER Working Paper, No. 22776, 2016); see also Mark Scott, Study Finds Some Uber and 
Lyft Drivers Racially Discriminate, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/ 
11/01/technology/uber-lyft-racial-discrimination.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/X3SM-EDTB]. 
 4 See Al Franken, Letter to Travis Kalanick and Logan Green (Nov. 2, 2016), https://www.fran 
ken.senate.gov/files/letter/161102_UberLyft.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FML-9MXH]; see also Megan 
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necessary to create a “digital trust profile,” they agreed to experiment 
with other ways to prevent discrimination. Franken, however, “re-
main[s] concerned” that the current systems “do not sufficiently guard 
against discriminatory conduct.”5 
In both of these examples, we see a public quick to condemn and 
demand fixes for discrimination perpetuated by individuals against 
other individuals, though facilitated and arguably encouraged by the 
companies synonymous with the on-demand economy. We also see com-
panies looking to mollify public outcry outside of litigation, with varying 
degrees of success.6 As I’ve written about in the labor context, public 
pressure on high-profile and reputation-sensitive companies has long 
been used to garner gains for workers, even when those workers are not 
the employees of the targeted company.7 And as we’ve also seen re-
cently, the public is ready and willing to boycott companies to protest 
companies’ policies and their leaders’ political affiliations.8 But eventu-
ally the question arises: what does the law say about these objected-to 
forms of discrimination? It is well and good if Airbnb and Uber volun-
tarily create and meaningfully enforce antidiscrimination policies, but 
are the types of discrimination the public objects to—discrimination en-
gaged in by one individual against another within the commercial 
 
Rose Dickey, Sen. Al Franken Asks Uber and Lyft about Alleged Racial Discrimination Against 
Passengers, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 3, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/11/03/sen-al-franken-asks-
uber-and-lyft-about-alleged-racial-discrimination-against-passengers [https://perma.cc/88QK-3S 
P9]. 
 5 See Megan Rose Dickey, In Light of Discrimination Concerns, Uber and Lyft Defend their 
Policies to Show Rider Names and Photos, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 29, 2016), https://techcrunch. 
com/2016/12/29/uber-lyft-respond-al-franken-about-discrimination [https://perma.cc/44HL-ZD6J]. 
 6 That is not to say there have not been some lawsuits. In June 2016, Gregory Selden, the 
African American Airbnb user who first created the #airbnbwhileblack hashtag, sued Airbnb for 
race discrimination on behalf of himself and other African-American Airbnb users. He argued that 
Airbnb was liable under federal civil rights law as a public accommodation. However, the district 
court never reached the substantive claim, instead granting Airbnb’s motion to compel arbitration 
consistent with the Terms of Service. See Memorandum Opinion, Selden et al. v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 
16-cv-00933, 2016 WL 6476934 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 1, 2016). 
 7 See Heather M. Whitney, Rethinking the Ban on Company—Labor Organization Coopera-
tion, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1455 (2016). 
 8 See Alana Semuels, Why #DeleteUber and Other Boycotts Matter, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/02/why-deleteuber-and-other-boycotts-
matter/517416/ [https://perma.cc/2ZBT-UHKX]; Cam Wolf, Pro-Trump Shoppers are Boycotting 
Nordstrom, Netflix, and More, RACKED (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.racked.com/2017/2/10/145 
77910/pro-trump-boycotting-nordstrom-netflix-starbucks-tj-maxx [https://perma.cc/9ZRZ-3QSN]; 
Paul Farhi, Breitbart News seems to be cleaning house after readers and advertisers drift away, 
WASHINGTON POST (June 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/is-breitbart-
news-veering-away-from-the-farthest-far-right/2017/06/06/35f91160-4ad1-11e7-a186-60c031eab6 
44_story.html?utm_term=.f55603158d39 [https://perma.cc/T76S-U5RF]; Lauren Sherman, Amidst 
backlash, Ivanka Trump clothing is secretly relabeled as Adrienne Vittadini, BUSINESS OF FASHION 
(April 24, 2017), https://www.businessoffashion.com/articles/news-analysis/ivanka-trump-clothing 
-relabeled-adrienne-vittadini [https://perma.cc/9CAG-ME32]. 
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sphere—illegal, for the individuals discriminating or for the companies 
facilitating it? And if our current antidiscrimination laws fail to cover 
these objected-to forms of discrimination, should they? Can they? 
There are at least two ways the law might be used to address the 
types of individual-on-individual discrimination seen in the on-demand 
economy: such discrimination may be directly prohibited, as discrimi-
nation by an employer against an employee is, or such discrimination 
may be limited indirectly, through the enactment of laws that prohibit 
companies from facilitating it. Indirect means can shape consumers’ de-
cision architecture along a spectrum, from providing a nudge toward 
non-discrimination to making the ability to discriminate impossible al-
together. The way antidiscrimination laws work in the home-seeking 
context provides one example of the nudging end of the spectrum. While 
today laws are not used to directly prohibit individuals from engaging 
in race discrimination when choosing where to live, laws directed at 
landlords, realtors, and developers prohibit these third-parties from fa-
cilitating home-seeker discrimination. This in turn raises the cost to 
home-seekers who try to discriminate.9 Along these lines, in an effort to 
eliminate discrimination against individuals with black-sounding 
names, we can imagine laws that prohibit companies like Airbnb, Uber, 
and eBay from showing users’ real names. Individual buyers and sellers 
may nevertheless find other ways to engage in discrimination—con-
sciously or not—but with the higher costs of doing so, such laws should 
result in at least somewhat less discrimination. 
There are likely pragmatic reasons to favor an indirect strategy of 
limiting individual-on-individual discrimination within the market. 
Companies are bigger, have deeper pockets, and some can be sensitive 
to reputational harms, which may combine to make enforcement eas-
ier.10 In addition, targeting individuals directly may result in forms of 
backlash or resentment that could result in more discrimination and 
racial animus—negative effects that might be avoided though a more 
indirect approach. These are all legitimate concerns that, on their own, 
may lead us to favor indirect action. But there is a qualitatively differ-
ent kind of concern that scholars and courts have intimated about direct 
prohibitions on discrimination by individuals—namely, that individu-
als have a constitutionally protected right to discriminate generally, 
which covers when they act in the market as consumers or sellers. For 
those who posit such a right, the direct regulation of individual discrim-
ination seems off the table, or at minimum constitutionally problematic. 
 
 9 See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Searching for Fair Housing, 97 B.U. L. REV. 349 (2017). 
 10 See Katharine T. Bartlett & Mitu Gulati, Discrimination by Customers, 102 IOWA L. REV. 
223, 228–31 (2016) (discussing these efficacy reasons). 
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But interestingly, at least some people who have this view think 
that the indirect regulation of individual discrimination avoids these 
issues. For instance, in their Article Discrimination by Customers, 
Katharine Bartlett and Mitu Gulati take the position that individuals 
qua consumers have autonomy and privacy rights that ought to block 
the enactment of direct prohibitions on their discrimination.11 However, 
they think additional indirect restrictions on customer discrimination, 
via additional restrictions on the companies that facilitate it, are ac-
ceptable.12 Similarly, Tarunabh Khaitan argues that antidiscrimina-
tion duties are not imposed on employees, tenants, and consumers be-
cause they have strong claims to negative liberty whereas employers, 
landlords, and sellers do not.13 But while Khaitan concludes that indi-
viduals have negative liberty claims that make direct prohibitions on 
their discrimination problematic, he does not see antidiscrimination du-
ties on sellers as also implicating those same individuals’ interests. I 
have begun to worry about this position. 
If individuals have a right to discriminate within the market, be 
they buyers or sellers, there is at least a prima facie case to be made 
that third-parties (like employers and sellers) will be able to challenge 
antidiscrimination laws targeted at them by invoking those individuals’ 
rights. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Fair Housing Council v. Room-
mates.com14 highlights the problem of conjoining a consumer right to 
discriminate with prohibitions on third-parties who facilitate or encour-
age that discriminatory conduct.15 There, Roommates.com challenged 
the constitutionality of a law that would prohibit it from facilitating its 
users’ discrimination in the selection of housemates on the grounds that 
such a law would constitute a burden on the constitutional right of its 
users to engage in that discrimination.16 The Ninth Circuit, invoking 
the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, appears to have agreed with 
Roommates.com’s argument.17 Fennell also recognizes this issue within 
 
 11 Id. at 226. 
 12 Id. at 249. 
 13 TARUNABH KHAITAN, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION LAW 212 (2015). 
 14 666 F.3d 1216 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 15 Id. 
 16 Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 51, Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Room-
mates.com, LLC, No. 09-55272, 2010 WL 2751575 (9th Cir. May 14, 2010) (“The injunction imper-
missibly inhibits the rights of home-seekers to state and act on preferences, however, by forbidding 
Roommates from making available to them formatted questions or matching using even voluntary 
responses. Denying such users of roommates.com the choice of focusing their search based on the 
characteristics of those with a home to share is not only unwarranted, it is unconstitutional.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 17 Roommates.com, 666 F.3d at 1222–23. 
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fair housing law. As she explains, some criticize prohibitions on discrim-
inatory collateral search behavior (the behavior of third-parties who 
might assist home-seekers in engaging in discrimination when finding 
and securing a property) on the grounds that such collateral behavior 
should be legal so long as the underlying discriminatory conduct of the 
home-seeker is.18 In other words, within fair housing law, some argue 
that if the underlying discrimination of home-seekers is legal, it should 
be just as legal for third-parties to help them engage in it.19 As a result, 
Fennell sees arguments that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 prohibits home-seekers 
from discriminating—regardless of whether § 1982 is enforced—as but-
tressing the direct liability for collateral search behavior created 
through the Fair Housing Act.20 
The problem of indirect restrictions on exercises of rights is not lim-
ited to antidiscrimination law. Consider the speech context. In Brown 
v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n,21 the Court struck down on First 
Amendment grounds a law that prohibited the sale of violent video 
games to minors absent parental consent.22 The Court found the law, 
which directly regulated only the activity of sellers, to violate the free 
speech rights of the buyers (i.e., the children). Scholars have also iden-
tified related First Amendment issues when state actors look to sup-
press individual speech by enlisting private actors like Facebook, 
Google, and ISPs.23 There are many other cases where the Court has 
struck down restrictions on actor A on the grounds that those re-
strictions infringed on the constitutional rights of actor B.24 In short, if 
individuals’ ability to discriminate on the basis of race and sex while 
engaged in market activity is constitutionally protected, then the indi-
rect laws favored by Bartlett and Gulati, and the explanation for why 
firms can be antidiscrimination duty-bearers while individuals cannot 
 
 18 See Fennell, supra note 9, at 395. 
 19 See id. 
 20 See id. (“[T]he fact that § 1982 reaches biased home-seeking can also be used to buttress 
direct liability for collateral search behavior under the FHA itself.”). 
 21 564 U.S. 786 (2011). 
 22 Id. at 786–87. 
 23 See generally Seth K. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Inter-
mediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11 (2006). 
 24 See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 445–46 (1972) (holding professor could challenge 
statute forbidding the distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons); Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190, 194–95 (1976) (permitting beer vendor to challenge law prohibiting the sale certain al-
cohol to males under 21 but only to women under 18 by invoking the Equal Protection rights of the 
buyers); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (discussing indirect burdens 
on abortion rights); Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(holding Wisconsin law requiring abortion providers to obtain admitting privileges at nearby hos-
pitals an unconstitutional unburden on women’s right to an abortion). 
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provided by Khaitan, look problematic. Such a right also renders vul-
nerable some of the antidiscrimination laws we have today. 
Given the above and the themes of this Symposium, my interest is 
in whether individuals qua market actors do or ought to have a right to 
discriminate on the basis of race or gender. As I hope the above shows, 
those concerned about the future of antidiscrimination law within the 
on-demand economy and beyond need to get clear on this. To that end, 
my goal in this Essay is modest. I simply want to lay down groundwork 
for thinking through whether, normatively or descriptively, there is an 
individual right to discriminate in the market. To that end, in Part I, I 
sketch some high-level considerations that those who want to assert or 
deny that individuals ought to have a right to discriminate in the mar-
ket need to think through. In Part II, I look at how the law currently 
treats discrimination by individuals within the market and how that 
treatment speaks whether there is an individual right to engage in that 
conduct today. 
II. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Here I focus on two issues surrounding the legitimacy of govern-
ment regulation of individual discrimination: (1) what makes the tar-
geted forms of discrimination legitimate targets and (2) the significance 
of the market in that determination. 
A. Government Legitimacy: Harm or Injustice 
Liberalism is committed to there being principled limits to legiti-
mate government authority. At the broadest level, liberals rely on ei-
ther concepts of harm or of injustice to mark those limits. 
Under what is known as the Millian Harm Principle, “the only pur-
pose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized society, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”25 Once 
the Harm Principle is triggered through the infliction of a third-party 
harm, legal regulations aimed at curbing that harmful act are legiti-
mate and the regulated-actor has no liberty-based objection to those 
regulations as such.26 
 
 25 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY, UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER ESSAYS 12–13 
(2015) (1859). 
 26 In other words, once there is a third-party harm, the end—preventing that harm—is legit-
imate. Under a Millian picture, your liberty is not violated when the state acts to prevent you from 
inflicting a third-party harm: your liberty interests end where third-party harms begin. One might 
object to the means the state uses to prevent the third-party harm but there is no liberty-based 
objection to the end—preventing third-party harm—itself. For a more detailed account of this, see 
Heather M. Whitney, The Autonomy Defense of Private Discrimination (2017) (unpublished man-
uscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2922241 [https://perma.cc/G444-FB55]. 
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John Rawls is associated with the alternative way of limiting the 
state’s legitimate power. On this view, the state can legitimately act to 
ensure justice, including both corrective and distributive forms.27 Be-
cause corrective justice looks a lot like remedies for harms, a simplified 
version might just say that liberals differ according to whether they 
think (1) the state can legitimately act to not only deal with harms but 
also distributive injustices and (2) if the answer to (1) is yes, whether, 
and if so how, the methods the government can use to respond to harms 
(i.e. the targets of corrective justice) and injustices (i.e. the targets of 
distributional justice) differ.28 
The above matters for whether the state can prohibit individuals 
from discriminating against each other, in the market and more gener-
ally. If we assume Bartlett, Gulati, and Khaitan are operating within a 
Millian framework when they say that prohibiting forms of consumer 
discrimination would violate those consumers’ negative liberty inter-
ests, they have committed themselves to the position that consumer dis-
crimination does not constitute a harm and thus government prohibi-
tions on that discrimination would be illegitimate.29 If one wants to 
resist this conclusion, one needs to (1) show that the relevant forms of 
discrimination do constitute harms or (2) reject the Millian framework, 
embrace the Rawlsian alternative, and then show that the relevant 
forms of discrimination result in distributional injustice, and thus the 
state can legitimately act to prevent or cure them. 
At the same time and so long as we are committed to liberal theory, 
the account of why the relevant forms of individual discrimination can 
be legitimately regulated (be it on a Millian or Rawlsian framework) 
cannot be one that decimates the principled limits of legitimate govern-
ment authority.30 As I said at the outset, liberalism is committed to 
there being principled limits to legitimate government authority. Given 
this, it would likely be problematic to take the position that individual 
discrimination is harmful (and thus legitimately proscribed) because we 
 
 27 John Gardner discusses this in more detail. See John Gardner, Discrimination as Injustice, 
16 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 353, 365 (1996). 
 28 See John Gardner, Liberals and Unlawful Discrimination, 9 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2–
3 (1989). 
 29 For a more careful parsing of these arguments see Whitney, supra note 26. 
 30 A libertarian worry lurks here. See David E. Bernstein, Context Matters: A Better Libertar-
ian Approach to Antidiscrimination Law, CATO UNBOUND (June 16, 2010), http://www.cato-un 
bound.org/2010/06/16/david-e-bernstein/context-matters-better-libertarian-approach-antidiscrimi 
nation-law [https://perma.cc/RR7U-5BEM] (“The proliferation of antidiscrimination laws explains 
why libertarians are loath to concede the principle that the government may ban private sector 
discrimination. There is no natural limit to the scope of antidiscrimination laws, because the con-
cept of antidiscrimination is almost infinitely malleable.”). Of course, the concept of harm is also 
susceptible to this criticism and yet libertarians (and liberal theory more generally) are committed 
to it as a legitimate doctrine. 
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harm each other whenever we fail to treat each other “equally.” In a 
liberal society individuals are permitted to act on their personal prefer-
ences and pursue their own projects in ways that will mean privileging 
some over others. If the state can require us to treat each other equally 
in all of our dealings, it looks like there is no space left at all for indi-
vidual decision-making free of state control (i.e. we are no longer within 
a liberal state).31 But this is all by way of warning—the literature on 
what makes various types of discrimination wrong is vast and an ac-
count can be given as to why the regulation of certain forms of discrim-
ination by individuals, at least within certain contexts, is legitimate (i.e. 
the discrimination is either harmful or results in distributional injus-
tice).32 The point here is twofold: such an account must be given for each 
kind of discrimination we want to target and we must be careful to not 
give an account that does away with our background commitment to a 
limited state. 
B. The Significance of the Market for Government Legitimacy33 
This Symposium is focused on changes to labor and work and so I 
have focused on whether individuals acting in the market have a right 
to discriminate. If they do, regulating the sorts of discrimination seen 
in the on-demand economy will be problematic and an increasing share 
of American workers may fall outside of the purview of our antidiscrim-
ination laws. But while there are pragmatic reasons I have focused on 
discrimination within the market, there is a separate question of 
whether the market/non-market distinction is theoretically significant. 
One might think the market/non-market distinction tracks something 
significant with regards to the legitimacy of antidiscrimination law. 
Then again, one might think the opposite—that there is nothing special 
about the market and accordingly there is nothing special about dis-
crimination that occurs there. In thinking through whether the state 
can legitimately prohibit discrimination by individuals within the mar-
ket (my narrow focus in this Essay) we may need to know whether the 
 
 31 See Gardner, supra note 28, at 3. 
 32 For some of this literature, see, e.g., TARUNABH KHAITAN, A THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION 
LAW 117–39 (2015); KASPER LIPPERT-RASMUSSEN, BORN FREE AND EQUAL? A PHILOSOPHICAL 
INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE OF DISCRIMINATION 103–192 (2014) (Part II is on the wrongness of dis-
crimination); PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF DISCRIMINATION LAW (Deborah Hellman & Sophia 
Moreau eds., 2013); Larry Alexander, What Makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? Biases, Pref-
erences, Stereotypes, and Proxies, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 218 (1992). For an example of work that rejects 
a broader equality of opportunity principle while supporting prohibitions on forms of discrimina-
tion, see MATT CAVANAGH, AGAINST EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY (2002). 
 33 My discussion here is brief. For more, see Heather M. Whitney, Markets, Rights, and Dis-
crimination by Customers, 102 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 346 (2017). 
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fact that the discrimination is occurring within the market matters for 
purposes of that analysis. 
One inroad into the significance of the market/non-market distinc-
tion requires a bit of a historical detour. As discussed above, liberals are 
committed to there being limits to governmental authority. In the 
United States, we have come up with different frameworks with differ-
ent limiting principles to mark these limits. During Reconstruction, 
both those opposed to and in favor of various antidiscrimination laws 
agreed to a tripartite theory of rights framework.34 There were civil 
rights, political rights, and social rights.35 Everybody basically agreed 
that while the government could legitimately act to ensure civil and po-
litical forms of equality, it was forbidden—that is, it would be illegiti-
mate to—protect social equality. With this framework in place, the de-
bate surrounding particular antidiscrimination laws centered on 
whether the laws were addressing civil, political, or social issues.36 
Those who objected to certain laws—like those prohibiting race discrim-
ination in public accommodations—argued that such laws were trying 
to illegitimately “enforce social . . . equality.”37 Within this tripartite 
framework, the market as such was not a special category. Some mar-
ket/economic rights were understood to fall squarely within the civil do-
main, like the capacity to hold property and enter contracts, while oth-
ers that also dealt with commercial activity, like deciding with whom to 
associate when doing business, were thought by some to be social and 
thus beyond the government’s legitimate reach.38 When the Court fi-
nally did uphold extensions of antidiscrimination laws to housing and 
private contracting,39 such cases were understood as “the triumph of 
civil rights.”40 That is, a triumph of getting the regulated activity to be 
understood as implicating civil and not social equality, and thus becom-
ing legitimate targets of regulation. 
 
 34 For a longer discussion, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Unrelenting Libertarian Challenge 
to Public Accommodations Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1205, 1210 (2014) (“Most public actors at the 
time seem to have taken for granted that there was a distinction between three classes of rights.”). 
 35 See id. 
 36 See id. at 1210. 
 37 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954). 
 38 See Bagenstos, supra note 34, at 1210. See also Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No 
Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1120 
(1997). 
 39 See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 440–41 (1968) (implicitly finding the Fair 
Housing Act constitutional); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976). 
 40 Bagenstos, supra note 34, at 1218. 
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Over time the tripartite theory fell away but the underlying and 
substantive tensions surrounding the legitimacy of government regula-
tion of private (i.e. non-government) discrimination continued.41 In the 
language of modern liberal theory we can put the concern like this: how 
can we have a state with limited powers and a space free from govern-
ment intervention while also increasingly regulating the choices non-
government actors make in deciding with whom to associate and on 
what basis? With that same concern remaining, alternative frameworks 
came about for trying to mark the limits of legitimate government au-
thority. More in use today is the public/private distinction, which is as 
contested and malleable as the tripartite theory before it.42 Another 
closely-related distinction, and the one I focus on here, draws a circle 
around economic activity and finds it a legitimate target of regulation. 
We can call this a market/non-market distinction. While I cannot con-
struct an entire history here, I see the idea that things taking place 
within the commercial domain can be treated differently for purpose of 
state regulation in, e.g., the historical treatment of commercial 
speech,43 fair use analysis in copyright,44 continued prohibitions on 
prostitution after Lawrence,45 the repudiation of Lochner,46 the repudi-
ation of the constitutional right to freedom of contract/economic sub-
stantive due process Lochner contained,47 and the resulting expansion 
of the administrative state with the New Deal. 
 
 41 See id. at 1209. 
 42 See id. at 1212; see also Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private 
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349 (1982). 
 43 At one point, commercial speech received no First Amendment protection. See Valentine v. 
Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1946), overruled in Va. State Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 44 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984) (stating that “a com-
mercial or profit-making purpose” was “presumptively” unfair). The Court walked this back some-
what ten years later. See Harper & Row Publ’rs, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) 
(stating that when copying is commercial it “tends to weigh against a finding of fair use”) (emphasis 
added). Almost ten years after, the Court made clear that commercial uses are not determinative 
in a fair use analysis, though still can weigh against a fair use finding if the new work not suffi-
ciently transformative. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (“[T]he 
more transformative the new work, the less will be the significance of other factors, like commer-
cialism, that may weigh against a finding of fair use.”). Even today, though, commerciality is used 
to argue strongly against a fair use determination. See Opening Brief and Addendum of Plaintiff-
Appellant at 27–28, Oracle v. Google, No. 17-1118 (Fed Cir. Feb. 10, 2017). 
 45 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (pointing out that the case “does not involve 
public conduct or prostitution”). 
 46 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 47 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding constitutionality of 
state minimum wage law). 
21 WHITNEY PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/17  12:16 PM 
537] THE REGULATION OF DISCRIMINATION BY INDIVIDUALS 547 
 
We have also seen the market/non-market distinction in antidis-
crimination law. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees,48 Justice O’Connor 
found “only minimal constitutional protection of the freedom of commer-
cial associations” as “[t]he Constitution does not guarantee a right to 
choose employees, customers, suppliers, or those with whom one en-
gages in simple commercial transactions, without restraint from the 
State.”49 As Samuel Bagenstos explains, Justice O’Connor’s position in 
Jaycees has been used to create an expressive-commercial distinction.50 
This distinction, in turn, has been used to limit the Court’s ruling in 
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,51 where it held that an organization’s 
First Amendment rights could trump the application of antidiscrimina-
tion laws.52 
However, like the tripartite theory of rights, the public/private dis-
tinction, efforts to cabin the harm principle, and construction of a neg-
ligence standard, the market/non-market distinction is an attempt to 
make sense of the limits of legitimate government authority in our lives 
and come to some kind of agreement about what we owe each other qua 
members of a community. These are not, I suspect, metaphysical kinds. 
As a result, the commercial-expressive and market/non-market distinc-
tions, with government interference with activities categorized in the 
former thought legitimate in ways it would not be for activities in the 
latter, is susceptible to critique.53 
The Court’s recent treatment of the commercial-expressive and 
market/non-market distinctions suggests its relationship to the distinc-
tions is increasingly ambivalent. Lawrence is an example of the Court 
embracing the distinction, where it pointed out that the case involved 
sex that took place outside the market.54 It is on this basis that lower 
courts have not found Lawrence to entail a constitutional right to pros-
titution.55 In contrast, within the First Amendment domain the mar-
 
 48 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 49 Id. at 633–34 (O’Connor, J. concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
 50 Bagenstos, supra note 34, at 1230. I see this as a close cousin to the market/non-market 
framework. 
 51 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 52 Id. at 640. The distinction works as a limit because the organization in question was not 
commercial. 
 53 Bagentos goes through some of these distinctions. See Bagentos, supra note 34, at 1231–40. 
I discuss some other problems in Whitney, supra note 26. 
 54 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (pointing out that the case “does not involve 
public conduct or prostitution”). 
 55 See, e.g., State v. Freitag, 130 P.3d 544, 546 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (“We thus join other state 
courts that have specifically rejected any constitutionally protected fundamental liberty or privacy 
interest in soliciting or engaging in prostitution.”) (case citations omitted). 
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ket/non-market distinction has increasingly eroded.56 Justice O’Con-
nor’s reliance on a market/non-market distinction in Jaycees and at-
tempts to cabin Dale aside, the Court’s increasing skepticism of the 
market/non-market distinction may soon find its way into antidiscrim-
ination laws within the market in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo-
rado Civil Rights Commission.57 
But putting aside the Court’s actual treatment of the market/non-
market framework, one might still think it the best heuristic available 
for making sense of the limits of government power.58 The point I want 
to make is this: to think through whether the government can legiti-
mately prohibit individuals from discriminating in the market, one 
needs to decide whether the “in the market” qualification matters. One 
might embrace the market/non-market distinction, tenuous as it is. Or 
one might reject it. The tripartite theory, too, has faded away. But at 
bottom I suspect we need some principled account of the legitimate lim-
its of government regulation and how antidiscrimination laws square 
with them.59 
III. A CONSUMER RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE UNDER CURRENT LAW 
So far I have discussed two larger legitimacy concerns regarding 
the regulation of individual discrimination in the market. Below I en-
gage the law on the ground. Specifically, I look at two statutes—Section 
 
 56 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S.Ct. 1744, 1767 (2017) ((“‘Commercial speech is no exception,’ to the 
principle that the First Amendment ‘requires heightened scrutiny whenever the government cre-
ates a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.’”) (citing Sorrell 
v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011)) (Kennedy, J., with whom Ginsburg, J., Sotomayor, J., and 
Kagan, J. joined, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)). I also discuss this erosion 
elsewhere. See Whitney, supra note 33, at 28. 
 57 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, docket no. 16-111, cert. granted 
June 26, 2017. The question presented is whether Colorado’s public accommodation law, which 
requires the petitioner to provide a wedding cake for a same-sex couple, unconstitutionally violates 
his free exercise or free speech rights under the First Amendment. 
 58 Some philosophers continue to defend the market/non-market distinction as a meaningful 
one. See, e.g., DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE (2010); MARGARET JANE 
RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 132–36 (1996); ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND 
ECONOMICS 150–58 (1993). Others within the libertarian tradition have disagreed and found the 
market/non-market distinction mistaken. See Jason Brennan & Peter Martin Jaworski, Markets 
Without Symbolic Limits, 125 ETHICS 1053 (2015). 
 59 As an example of another approach, some have thought antidiscrimination duties can be 
legitimately targeted at entities that distribute primary social goods or are agents of distributive 
justice. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 27, at 363 (discussing employers as agents of distributive 
justice). While at first blush this seems to exclude the imposition of antidiscrimination duties on 
individuals, some have argued that individuals do distribute primary social goods—for instance, 
they argue that romantic relationships are primary social goods. Thus, the regulation of online 
dating sites is legitimate. See Sonu Bedi, Sexual Racism: Intimacy as a Matter of Justice, 77 J. 
POL. 998 (2015). 
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1981 (briefly) and Title VII (more extensively)—to see how the law cur-
rently treats race and sex discrimination by individuals in the market. 
A. Section 1981 
The history of § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is long and I 
will not recount it all here. In broad strokes, one of the main abuses the 
framers of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 were aware of was not the abuse 
of large employers but of individual white land owners contracting with 
free blacks in ways that recreated the conditions of slavery.60 The pub-
lic/private or private/state action distinctions we find significant today 
were not of concern.61 Instead, “a principle purpose of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866” was to “grant to the Freedmen basic economic rights—to 
make and enforce contracts, to sue and be sued, and to purchase and 
lease property. These rights would enable them to act as autonomous, 
productive workers, who could hope to accumulate some material 
wealth.”62 While originally enacted to enforce the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, there was uncertainty about whether § 1981 could reach private 
discrimination after it was reenacted under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.63 However, the later Runyon v. McCrary64 Court held that it did.65 
In Runyon, the Court held that when a private school discriminated 
against blacks in admissions, it violated § 1981. The Court found that 
refusing to contract with a black person violated the black person’s 
right, under § 1981, to have the “same opportunity to enter into con-
tracts as” is “extend[ed] to white offerees.”66 In concluding, the Court 
 
 60 See Barry Sullivan, Historical Reconstruction, Reconstruction History, and the Proper Scope 
of Section 1981, 98 YALE L.J. 541, 554 (1989) (“[F]ormer masters generally did not refuse to con-
tract with their former slaves, but recognized the use of labor contracts as a means of reintroducing 
practical slavery, insisting on terms so onerous as to leave the Freedmen worse off than they had 
been under slavery.”). See also Danielle Tarantolo, From Employment to Contract: Section 1981 
and Antidiscrimination Law for the Independent Contractor Workforce, 116 YALE L.J. 170, 186 
(2006). 
 61 See Sullivan, supra note 60, at 545 (“The Thirty-ninth Congress was little concerned with 
any theoretical distinction between public and private action in early 1866, but was committed to 
giving effect to the Thirteenth Amendment by ‘secur[ing] to all persons within the United States 
practical freedom.’”) (citations omitted). 
 62 Tarantolo, supra note 60, at 550. 
 63 See Sullivan, supra note 60. 
 64 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
 65 Id. at 176 (“[T]he Constitution . . . places no value on discrimination, and . . . [i]nvidious 
private discrimination . . . has never been accorded affirmative constitutional protection.”). See 
also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayber Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (interpreting § 1982 as applying to indi-
vidual discrimination). 
 66 Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170–71 (1976). 
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thought a school refusing to contract with blacks for educational ser-
vices constitute a “classic violation of section 1981.”67 The Court came 
to this conclusion in the face of school and parental claims that they had 
a constitutional right to discriminate in their associations.68 Sec-
tion 1981 became, after Runyon, “a powerful weapon against private 
racial discrimination in a wide variety of relationships which may be 
defined as contractual in nature.”69 
Later, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991,70 which en-
dorsed the Court’s interpretation of § 1981.71 As “it currently reads, 
§ 1981 prohibits racial discrimination in all forms of contracting, no 
matter how minor or personal.”72 While the statute has been “unjustly 
neglected as a source of protection for civil rights,” it remains on the 
books and suggests that we have historically upheld prohibitions on in-
dividual discrimination within the market. Like Fennell’s reading of 
§ 1982, § 1981’s prohibition on race discrimination in contracting but-
tresses the legitimacy of laws that seek to limit consumer discrimina-
tion by prohibiting third-parties from facilitating or selling it.73 
B. Title VII and the BFOQ Exception 
Intentional discrimination in employment is illegal—usually.74 Ti-
tle VII prohibits, among other things, employers from intentionally dis-
criminating against employees on the basis of race and sex.75 But while 
that prohibition is absolute when it comes to disparate treatment on the 
basis of race, sex discrimination is permitted when sex qualifies as a 
bona fide occupational requirement (“BFOQ”) “reasonably necessary to 
the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.”76 What 
 
 67 Id. at 172. 
 68 Id. at 175–76. 
 69 Note, The Expanding Scope of Section 1981: Assault on Private Discrimination and a Cloud 
on Affirmative Action, 90 HARV. L. REV. 412, 422 (1976). 
 70 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
 71 See George Ruterglen, The Improbable History of Section 1981: Clio still bemused and con-
fused, 2003 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 306 (2003). 
 72 Id. 
 73 See Fennell, supra note 9, at 395. 
 74 See generally Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Per-
missible Sex Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147 (2004) (paraphrasing Kimberly Yuracko). 
 75 42 U.S.C.§ 2000e-2 (2000). Title VII prohibits both intentional (disparate treatment) as well 
as some unintentional (disparate impact) discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). See 
also Griggs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971) (allowing an employer to defend against a 
disparate impact claim by showing the policy or practice is “demonstrably a reasonable measure 
of job performance”); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009). Below I focus on whether con-
sumers have a right to intentionally discriminate. 
 76 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000). The fact that discrimination is ever permissible is in direct 
conflict with the plurality’s broad language in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
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counts as a BFOQ and how does it relate to an individual right to dis-
criminate in the market? EEOC Guidelines state that “the refusal to 
hire an individual because of the preferences of . . . clients or customers” 
does not warrant the application of the BFOQ exception unless that dis-
crimination is “necessary for the purpose of authenticity or genuine-
ness.”77 This language suggests that consumers do not have a right to 
engage in race and sex discrimination, or at least that that right is not 
violated when Title VII prohibits employers from selling that discrimi-
nation. However, in a 2002 opinion letter the EEOC recognized that this 
categorical statement was not entirely accurate; sometimes courts have 
permitted employers to successfully argue for a BFOQ exception by re-
ferring to the discriminatory preferences of consumers that go beyond 
issues of authenticity or genuineness.78 But not all consumer discrimi-
natory preferences are treated equally. So what does this mean for a 
recognized consumer right to discriminate? 
Given that the BFOQ exception does not include race, consumer 
racial preferences never legitimate a company’s racially discriminatory 
policy.79 As it looks and as § 1981 already suggests, there is simply no 
right to buy or sell race discrimination. Putting § 1981 aside and focus-
ing solely on Title VII, there is no consumer right to engage in race dis-
crimination that blocks laws that prohibit third-parties from selling ra-
cial discrimination to them.80 
Things are more complicated when it comes to consumer demand 
for sex or gender-based discrimination. Consumer sex-discrimination 
demands can be broken down into two categories: those concerning sex-
ual titillation and those concerning privacy.81 Courts treat these de-
mands differently. When employers argue that consumers want to en-
gage in sex-discrimination for privacy-based reasons, courts are much 
more willing to find sex a legitimate BFOQ than in cases where employ-
ers argue consumers want to engage in sex-discrimination for purposes 
 
There, invoking a sex-and-gender-blindness conception of Title VII, the Court interpreted the Act 
“to mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions.” Id. at 240 (Brennan, J., plural-
ity) (emphasis added). 
 77 29 C.F.R. 1604.2(a)(1)(iii) (emphasis added). 
 78 EEOC OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL OPINION LETTER RE: TITLE VII: BFOQ (March 5, 2002), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2002/titlevii_bfoq.html [https://perma.cc/3PV4-YJ38]. 
 79 In using “preferences” I do not mean to subscribe to a Gary Becker-type conception of race 
discrimination as a matter of “taste.” See GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14–
15 (2d ed. 1971). Race discrimination is not a matter of mere individualized taste. For a more 
thorough explanation of why, see Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics 
of Group Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003 (1995). 
 80 Of course, there are more subtle ways to sell racial homogeneity. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, 
Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437 (2006). 
 81 See Yuracko, supra note 74. 
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of sexual titillation. Indeed, while in the former case some courts have 
raised—though not fully explored or committed to there being—con-
sumers’ constitutional privacy rights at stake, the latter are resolved 
without any reference to consumer rights at all. Let’s now turn to these 
two categories in more detail. 
1. Sex discrimination for sexual titillation 
In sexual titillation cases, “employers argue that they must dis-
criminate on the basis of sex in hiring to provide customers with the 
type of sexual arousal their businesses promise.”82 Courts’ treatment of 
these cases fall along a continuum: on one end are cases where employ-
ers are selling explicit sexual gratification (e.g., prostitution or lap 
dances) and particular types of bodies are thought necessary.83 Here 
scholars assume courts would permit sex-based hiring as a BFOQ.84 In 
the middle of the spectrum are cases involving the sale of sexual arousal 
through the exclusive sale of sexual gaze objects (e.g., strippers and cen-
terfolds).85 Here as well, courts and commentators have assumed sex a 
BFOQ.86 On the other end of the spectrum are “plus-sex” businesses, 
which sell nonsexual goods bundled with sexual arousal through the 
provision of sexual gaze objects (e.g., flights plus sexy flight attendants, 
restaurants plus sexy servers). Here, courts almost invariably reject sex 
as a legitimate BFOQ, finding sex not “essential” to the business oper-
ation, with courts confidently deigning the essence of the business the 
non-sexy part.87 
 
 82 Id. at 155–56. 
 83 Id. at 156. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. at 157. 
 86 Id. at 158. See also, e.g., Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 (N.D. Tex. 
1981) (“[I]n jobs where sex or vicarious sexual recreation is the primary service provided, e.g. a 
social escort or topless dancer, the job automatically calls for one sex exclusively.”). 
 87 Yuracko, supra note 74, at 158. Yuracko criticizes courts’ attempt to determine the essence 
of these businesses. See id. Pan American and Southwest are often thought a paragon of this. See 
Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). There, the Fifth Circuit rejected 
Pan Am’s BFOQ argument that it hired only female flight attendants because, in part, customers 
preferred female stewardesses for their skill in “non-mechanical aspects” of the job, such as 
“providing reassurance to anxious passengers, giving courteous personalized service and, in gen-
eral, making flights as pleasurable as possible within the limitations imposed by aircraft opera-
tions.” Id. at 387. While the court acknowledged that woman flight attendants increased the pleas-
antness of the environment through their “obvious cosmetic effect,” this was non-essential to the 
business, which was “provid[ing] safe transportation from one place to another.” Id. at 388. See 
also Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. at 302 (holding that, even though Southwest explicitly ad-
vertised as the ‘love airline’ and on that basis hired only female flight attendants, sex was not a 
legitimate BFOQ because the company’s primary function was to “transport passengers safely and 
quickly”). 
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What do courts’ treatment of employer BFOQ arguments premised 
on consumer demand for sex-discriminatory sexual titillation tells us 
about a consumer right to discriminate? First, when considering these 
BFOQ arguments courts do not view the ability (or inability) of individ-
uals to buy sexual arousal (the sale of which is assumed to require sex 
discrimination in hiring) to impinge on buyers’ constitutional rights. 
Take Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co.,88 where Southwest’s BFOQ ar-
gument for hiring only attractive women flight attendants was re-
jected.89 Southwest presented market data showing that customers 
wanted to buy air travel bundled with sexual gratification.90 In rejecting 
the argument, the court never entertained the notion that consumers 
have a right to either buy sexual gratification specifically or engage in 
sex discrimination generally while in the market, such that employees’ 
Title VII antidiscrimination rights and the correlative antidiscrimina-
tion duties on employers had to be shaped in light of them. 
That courts see no constitutional issue with limiting the ability of 
consumers to buy sex discrimination for sexual titillation purposes—be 
it bundled with other goods or not—is in one way not surprising. In the 
United States, there is no general right to buy sex. Prostitution, the 
most obvious form of this, is prohibited in most jurisdictions.91 Given 
this, one might take the position that if there’s no right to buy sex—if 
the state can ban the sale of literal sex—then the state is also free to 
ban as much or as little of the sale of in-person sexual gratification or 
titillation as it deems necessary, and consumers have no rights-based 
objection to it.92 
A few thoughts about this. On the above view, the state’s right to 
block the sale of in-person sexual gratification must be stronger than 
any individual’s right to buy sex. The state’s right to block the sale of 
in-person sexual gratification also must be stronger than any individ-
ual’s right to buy sex discrimination. For both of these to be true, it 
seems necessary to subscribe to the market/non-market distinction and 
framework I discussed earlier.93 Here’s why: in striking down an anti-
sodomy law, the Lawrence Court identified a substantive due process 
 
 88 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
 89 Id. at 304. 
 90 Id. at 295. 
 91 Some might disagree with this claim. See, e.g., MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF 
THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN WITH STRICTURES ON POLITICAL AND MORAL SUBJECTS 338 (1796) (describ-
ing marriage as “legal prostitution”). 
 92 I say “in-person” because the First Amendment is understood to protect the sale and pur-
chase of non-obscene pornography (speech). 
 93 See section I.B. See also Whitney, supra note 33, at 26–37. 
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liberty interest in choosing one’s sexual partners.94 In order for bans on 
prostitution (and perhaps the sale of sexual titillation and gratification 
more generally) to be constitutional (or at minimum not subject to con-
stitutional challenge), we have to think that the Lawrence liberty inter-
est in choosing a sexual partner (a liberty interest in being free to dis-
criminate on the basis of sex when having sex) is limited to the non-
commercial sphere. Some reject the market/non-market framework, 
think there is nothing special about the market, and thus conclude that 
bans on prostitution are, post-Lawrence, unconstitutional. So far, this 
argument has been unsuccessful,95 though given the Court continues to 
erode the market/non-market distinction, 96 it is conceivable that in the 
future the framework will be wholly rejected and Lawrence will be read 
to provide a right to have consensual sex with whomever we want for 
money. And if that happens, it seems to entail, at minimum, a right to 
engage in sex discrimination when choosing one’s commercial sex part-
ner (since that is what Lawrence was about). It is an open question 
whether this newly-extended right also includes a right to engage in 
race discrimination for the same.97 If it does, and erotic exceptionalism 
enters the market, it is possible that some will try to extend that right 
even further, to construct a general right to engage in sex and race dis-
crimination within all commercial transactions. 
In short, the treatment of sex titillation BFOQ cases suggests, at 
minimum, that individuals have no right to buy in-person sexual grati-
fication. It does not show that consumers have no right to engage in sex 
discrimination for things they can buy. If Lawrence results in the future 
protection of prostitution, then we seem to get a protected right to en-
gage in sex, and possibly race, discrimination while in the market. Once 
introduced, Lawrence becomes a deregulatory device for those looking 
to limit and roll back antidiscrimination laws in the market. This is, 
borrowing from Bagentos, the unrelenting libertarian challenge to an-
tidiscrimination law.98 
 
 94 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 95 See, e.g., People v. Williams, 811 N.E.2d 1197 (Ill. App. 3 Dist. 2004); State v. Freitag, 130 
P.3d 544, 546 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (“We thus join other state courts that have specifically rejected 
any constitutionally protected fundamental liberty or privacy interest in soliciting or engaging in 
prostitution.”) (citations omitted). Again, likely in part because of the Court’s dicta in Lawrence. 
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case . . . does not involve public conduct or prostitu-
tion. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.”). 
 96 See section I.B. See also Whitney, supra note 33, at 26–37. 
 97 For more discussion of the complications of race and sex discrimination in the realm of sex 
work, see Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Sex Work: Erotic Assimilationism, Erotic Exceptionalism, 
and the Challenge of Intimate Labor, 103 CAL. L. REV. 1195, 1262–73 (2015). 
 98 See Bagentos, supra note 34. 
21 WHITNEY PROOF G.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/17  12:16 PM 
537] THE REGULATION OF DISCRIMINATION BY INDIVIDUALS 555 
 
2. Sex discrimination for privacy 
In contrast to the purchase of sexual titillation, employers are more 
able to engage in sex-discrimination when they argue that consumers’ 
privacy interests would be offended or infringed if they did not.99 As 
Yuracko describes, these cases also fall on a BFOQ privacy continuum, 
measured by degrees of physical and visual contact.100 The strongest 
BFOQ claims involve jobs requiring either actual physical contact with 
or inspection of the consumer’s naked body.101 These claims are the most 
likely to succeed.102 In the middle of the spectrum are jobs where em-
ployees see but do not touch consumers’ bodies in various stages of un-
dress.103 In general, courts find customer interests in not being seen na-
ked by members of the opposite sex sufficiently compelling as to justify 
sex-discriminatory employment practices.104 The weakest privacy cases 
do not necessarily involve employees seeing or touching consumers’ na-
ked bodies but are thought to merely involve consumer or co-employee 
embarrassment or discomfort when performed by members of the oppo-
site sex.105 These claims are only sometimes successful.106 
 
 99 See Yuracko, supra note 74, at 156 (“Courts have generally been quite permissive toward 
sex discrimination committed on behalf of customer privacy.”). 
 100 Id. We might also add to the continuum the presence of children, since courts may be more 
likely to find same-sex hiring essential in those spaces. 
 101 See id. Cf. Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1416 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (“[I]n cer-
tain situations the privacy rights of individuals justify sex-based hiring by an employer” and these 
situations generally involve occupations that require workers to “work with or around individuals 
whose bodies are exposed in varying degrees.”). 
 102 See Yuracko, supra note 74, at 156. 
 103 See id. at 157. 
 104 Id. While not consumers, cases involving opposite-sex prison guards in sex-segregated pris-
ons have been especially thorny, regardless of whether the guards see prisoners naked. Compare 
Ambat v. City and County of San Francisco, 757 F.3d 1017, 1030 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding the record 
to not demonstrate that the presence of male deputies violated female inmate privacy given poli-
cies that prevented male deputies from taking on duties, like strip searches, that might violate 
those interests), Henry v. Milwaukee County, 539 F.3d 573, 581–86 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding male 
sex not a BFOQ in juvenile men’s unit because job responsibilities could be rearranged to protect 
inmate privacy), Griffin v. Michigan Department of Corrections, 654 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Mich. 
1982) (holding sex not a BFOQ for officers in an all-male prison regardless of whether female of-
ficers saw them naked because male inmates did not have a protected privacy right to not be 
viewed naked by female officers), and Gunther v. Iowa State Men’s Reformatory, 612 F.2d 1079, 
1085–87 (8th Cir. 1980) (same in prison), with Everson v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 391 F.3d 737, 747–
61 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding female sex a BFOQ for certain guard positions in women’s prison), 
Torres v. Wis. Dep’t of Health & Social Service, 859 F.2d 1523, 1528–32 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc) 
(holding female sex may be a BFOQ based on female inmates’ need), and Dothard v. Rawlinson, 
433 U.S. 321, 334–37 (1977) (holding sex a BFOQ for guards in men’s prison). 
 105 See Yuracko, supra note 74, 157. 
 106 See id. Compare Norwood v. Dale Maint. Syst., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1418 (N.D. Ill. 1984) 
(holding that sex was a BFOQ for staffing attendants who cleaned single-sex restrooms in a large 
office building because office workers would feel “embarrassment” and “increased stress” if they 
expected to see members of the opposite sex in the washroom) with EEOC v. Hi 40 Corp., 953 F. 
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In most privacy-based cases where courts find a legitimate BFOQ 
for sex discrimination, courts do not explain it by reference to a con-
sumer constitutional right to privacy that would be infringed if the 
firm’s BFOQ argument were denied. However, that is not always the 
case. In Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc.,107 a court did tie the 
privacy-based BFOQ exception for sex discrimination to a consumer pri-
vacy right.108 Below, I briefly lay out Fesel and then turn to the compli-
cations around the consumer privacy-based right to engage in discrim-
ination that it finds. 
a. Fesel 
In Fesel, a retirement home refused to hire a male nurse’s aide be-
cause it claimed its women residents would not consent to having their 
“personal needs attended to by a male” and would in fact leave the fa-
cility if there were male nurse’s aides.109 As the court rightly saw, the 
women refused to be aided by male nurse’s aides “undoubtedly” as a 
result of sex stereotyping.110 This refusal was a form of “customer pref-
erence,” which on its own could not justify a job qualification based on 
sex.111 However, in upholding the home’s BFOQ defense, the court un-
derstood this particular discriminatory preference as not just a discrim-
inatory preference but a privacy interest protected by law.112 
As for the specific activities that implicated the relevant privacy 
interest, the court pointed to the intimacy of the personal care, which 
included bathing, toilet assistance, geriatric pad changes, and catheter 
care.113 The court concluded that each of these functions “involves a per-
sonal touching as to which each guest is privileged by law to discrimi-
nate on any basis.”114 The court located the source of this legal privilege 
in tort and criminal law, though never pointed to any specific law. In-
stead, the court asserted generally that “[b]ecause our tort and criminal 
 
Supp. 301, 302–305 (W.D. Mo. 1996) (holding that sex was not a BFOQ in the hiring of weight-loss 
counselors even though 95% of the company’s clients were women, most of whom felt uncomforta-
ble with males taking their body-fat measurements and discussing the various emotional and 
physiological issues associated with weight loss with them; and finding the privacy interest only 
“minimal”). 
 107 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), aff ’d 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 108 Id. at 1352. See also Backus v. Baptist Medical Center, 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1193–94 (E.D. 
Ark. 1981) (identifying patients’ interest in female-only delivery nurses on the basis of a constitu-
tional right to privacy). 
 109 Fesel, 447 F. Supp. at 1352. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 See id. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 1353 (emphasis added). 
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laws recognize these personal privacy interests, the Home cannot le-
gally force its female guests to accept personal care from males.”115 
b. Complications around a consumer privacy-based right to 
engage in discrimination 
I take the Fesel court’s thinking to be something like this: as both 
tort and criminal law show, individuals get to choose who touches them 
and they get to make that decision based on whatever they like. That 
is, when someone touches you without your consent, it does not matter 
(for purposes of criminal and tort law) if you refused consent because 
that person was a man, black, or simply wore shoes you found unpleas-
ant—each person is “privileged by law to discriminate on any basis.”116 
And from this the court concluded that since “the Home cannot legally 
force its female guests to accept personal care from males” without vio-
lating those guests’ touching-related rights, the state cannot prohibit 
the home from hiring only female nurses.117 Thus, a BFOQ exception is 
required. 
While perhaps intuitively appealing on first pass, there are prob-
lems with the Fesel court’s analysis. While it is true that the law of bat-
tery protects patients from unwanted physical contact, which a patient 
can demonstrate in the medical domain by showing (1) that she did not 
consent to either the touching that occurred or (2) that the touching was 
done by an unwanted medical provider, antidiscrimination laws do not 
raise this problem; the nurse’s aide—whatever their sex, gender, and 
race—will only touch the guest once that guest has consented.118 Cru-
cially, “every legal right that patients have to privacy is rendered irrel-
evant by the fact that patients must consent to medical procedures.”119 
Denying the Home’s BFOQ defense only means that the Home is unable 
to guarantee its guests that the available aide will be a woman. If there 
are only male nurse’s aides available, the individual guest can—indeed 
has a constitutionally protected right to—refuse that aid.120 Given this, 
the privacy interest the court is worried about—the one connected to 
tort and criminal law—is in fact not in play at all. Regardless of whether 
 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. 
 118 For more, see Kimani Paul-Emile, Patients’ Racial Preferences and the Medical Culture of 
Accommodation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 462 (2012). 
 119 Amy Kapczynski, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 112 YALE 
L.J. 1257, 1268 (2003). 
 120 See Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (“The prin-
ciple that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing un-
wanted medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions.”). 
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the court accepts the BFOQ defense, the Home is never “legally forc[ing] 
its female guests to accept personal care from males.”121 
Second, the court’s statement that the aid administered “involves 
a personal touching as to which each guest is privileged by law to dis-
criminate on any basis” is false.122 As Robert Post points out, “if the 
nursing home residents in Fesel had claimed a privacy right not to be 
touched by nurse’s aides who were African American, their expectations 
would no doubt properly and ruthlessly be overridden by Title VII.”123 
It is easy to see why, at first blush, a particular privacy right may 
seem imperiled by a particular antidiscrimination law. But, our first-
pass intuitions are supposed to be the start and not the end of our in-
quiry. Upon careful attention to both the contours of the relevant inter-
est and the mechanisms of the relevant law we can see, as the discus-
sion of Fesel shows, that sometimes our intuitions are wrong; perceived 
conflicts can turn out to be illusory ones.124 
c. Privacy rights and the legitimacy of antidiscrimination 
laws in the market 
That consumer sex-discriminatory preferences couched in the lan-
guage of privacy are often the most successful suggests that if consum-
ers have a constitutional objection to Title VII’s restrictions on employ-
ers’ ability to sell them discrimination, the right derives from either the 
Fourth Amendment or the hazier constellation of constitutional sources 
from which other privacy rights derive.125 A few brief thoughts on this. 
 
 121 Fesel, 447 F. Supp. at 1353. One might push back here and say there is de facto coercion, 
given the medical context. I’m sympathetic to this more robust conception of coercion but leave for 
another time the many difficulties it raises. For instance, if that is right, then must private com-
panies always have available doctors and other staff who can satisfy the prejudices of patients or 
else be guilty of coercing those patients to touching they do not want? I doubt it. 
 122 Id. at 1353 (emphasis added). 
 123 ROBERT C. POST ET. AL., PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 1–53 (2001) 
 124 For more in this vein, see Amy Kapczynski, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidis-
crimination Law, 112 YALE L.J. 1257, 1273–74 (2003) (“Same-sex privacy doctrine cannot be de-
fended with recourse to the law of privacy. In many cases, the third parties in question have no 
relevant privacy rights. Even where they do have such rights, it is not self-evident that there is or 
ought to be a link between those privacy rights and sex.”); Deborah Calloway, Equal Employment 
and Third Party Privacy Interests: An Analytical Framework for Reconciling Competing Rights, 54 
FORDHAM L. REV. 327 (1985). 
 125 While the Constitution “does not explicitly mention any right of privacy” the Court has rec-
ognized constitutionally protected privacy interests stemming from a variety of constitutional 
sources. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), most canonically ties Fourth Amendment pro-
tection to individuals’ reasonable expectations of privacy. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring) 
(“My understanding of the rule . . . is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a person have 
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”). Outside of the Fourth Amendment, the Roe 
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First, a consumer right undergirded by a vague idea of Fourth 
Amendment-based privacy rights may help explain why consumers’ sex 
but not race discrimination is sometimes legitimated. In the Fourth 
Amendment context, courts still occasionally find the sex but not race 
of individuals relevant in determining whether a search is unreasona-
ble.126 For instance, in Byrd v. Maricopa County Sheriff ’s Department,127 
the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc held that as a matter of law a strip 
search of a male prisoner by a female cadet was unreasonable in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment.128 The Ninth Circuit underscored the 
“longstanding recognition that ‘[t]he desire to shield one’s unclothed fig-
ure from [the] view of strangers, and particularly strangers of the oppo-
site sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and personal dignity.’”129 
Given this, the court found cross-sex strip searches especially degrad-
ing, humiliating, and in so being, unreasonable absent an emergency.130 
Although the Byrd court found the opposite-sex strip search to violate 
the inmate’s Fourth Amendment rights, it is hard to imagine any court 
finding that inmates have a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim on the 
basis of being strip-searched by someone of a different race. In 2017, we 
no longer recognize as reasonable—at least for purposes of Fourth 
Amendment analysis—privacy-based arguments for racial segrega-
tion.131 
The complication here is that while sex-discriminatory preferences 
are sometimes part of a Fourth Amendment analysis, Fourth Amend-
ment-based privacy interests are not obviously present in cases where 
firms are prohibited from satisfying the discriminatory preferences of 
consumers. BFOQ cases concern the privacy interests consumers have 
in relation to other non-government actors, where the Fourth Amend-
ment does not typically apply. Instead, as the court in Fesel noted, to 
know our privacy rights vis-à-vis other non-state actors, we refer to tort 
and criminal laws. And in contrast to Fourth Amendment cases, where 
 
Court identified the “roots” of a right of personal privacy, “or a guarantee of certain areas or zones 
of privacy” as stemming from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, in 
addition to locating it in “the penumbras of the Bill of Rights.” Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 
(1973). 
 126 Though, as many scholars critique the legitimization of consumer sex-discrimination via 
the BFOQ exception, so do others critique the legitimization of sex-discrimination via the Fourth 
Amendment finding of reasonableness. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Unsexing the Fourth Amend-
ment, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855 (2015). 
 127 629 F.3d 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 128 Id. at 1136. 
 129 Id. at 1141 (citing York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963)). 
 130 Id. at 1143–47 (emphasis added). 
 131 Though it is worth pointing out that consumers have historically raised privacy objections 
to racial integration. See RACE AND RETAIL: CONSUMPTION ACROSS THE COLOR LINE (2015). 
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courts sometimes recognize a sex-discriminatory privacy interest, tort 
and criminal laws concerning privacy are not crafted in sex-discrimina-
tory terms. The success of privacy-related tort does not depend on the 
sex or gender of the actors involved. 
If vague Fourth Amendment “reasonableness” notions motivate 
consumer privacy BFOQ cases, upon reflection it seems an odd fit given 
the lack of state action. If privacy interests protected by tort and crimi-
nal law are the source of a consumer right to discriminate, upon reflec-
tion it seems equally as odd. 
The Fourth Amendment, though, is not the only constitutional 
source of privacy rights. Contraception cases like Griswold and abortion 
cases like Roe rely on substantive due process and “zones of privacy” 
and “penumbras” stemming from several constitutional sources.132 
These cases also show that constitutionally-protected privacy interests 
can be violated by government regulation of third-parties and/or the re-
lationship between individuals and third-parties.133 Might the con-
sumer privacy right to discriminate averred to in BFOQ cases be the 
same one(s) protected in Griswold or Roe? Perhaps, but it would require 
taking the position that sex-discriminating in the market is a personal 
right that is either “fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.”134 And while Roe listed a number of decisional areas where the 
relevant privacy right(s) extended—into “activities relating to mar-
riage; procreation; contraception; family relationships; and child rear-
ing and education”—it would be a leap to argue that the list should also 
include the entire domain of market activity.135 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The fact that individuals discriminate against other individuals 
within the market is undeniable.136 So far the law has rarely targeted 
it directly. For a number of reasons, the visibility of discrimination in 
the on-demand economy has prompted a rethinking of this choice. But 
even for those who favor some expansion of antidiscrimination laws, 
there is a worry that individuals might have a right to discriminate in 
the market. Worry in mind, these same authors suggest that consumer 
 
 132 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 
(1973). 
 133 See generally Griswold, 381 U.S. 479. 
 134 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152–53 (1973). 
 135 Id. 
 136 The legal literature has acknowledged consumer discrimination in tipping since at least 
2005. See Ian Ayres, Fredrick E. Vars, and Nasser Zakariya, To Insure Prejudice: Racial Dispari-
ties in Taxicab Tipping, 114 YALE L.J. 1613 (2005). 
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discrimination should instead be targeted indirectly, through addi-
tional regulations on the third-parties, like Uber and Airbnb, that facil-
itate it. Such indirect action could include prohibiting these companies 
from showing users’ real names or photos. 
This Essay was motivated by a concern with this line of thinking. 
As I explained, if individuals do have a constitutional right to discrimi-
nate while in the market, these indirect methods may be much more 
problematic than these authors seem to think. Thus, it is my suggestion 
that we take a step back before going much further. Instead of taking 
as true the vague intuition that directly prohibiting consumer discrim-
ination would violate those consumers’ rights, we need to examine that 
intuition.137 We need to understand whether the government can, in 
fact, legitimately prohibit individuals from discriminating in the mar-
ket. Part of this inquiry requires a fleshed-out account of whether the 
regulated-discrimination is harmful or unjust. In trying to craft mean-
ingful limits to the government’s legitimate authority within liberal 
theory, we also need to decide whether a market/non-market distinction 
is a helpful one. I outlined my early thinking on these questions in Part 
II. A related question is whether, today, the law suggests individuals 
have a right to discriminate in the market. And, as in the case of pri-
vacy-based BFOQ cases, whether the arguments courts give to explain 
those rights are sound. Given both § 1981 and a closer inspection of the 
consumer sexual titillation and privacy interests raised in BFOQ cases, 
I find it unlikely that individuals have, today, a right to engage in race 
and sex discrimination while in the market. 
 
 137 I develop this analysis further in other work. See Whitney, supra note 33. 
